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EVIDENCE- IMPEACHING CREDIBILITY- PRIOR SEXUAL EXPERIENCE
-The Superior Court of Pennsylvania has held it impermissible
to question a rape victim about her prior sexual experience for the
purpose of impeaching her credibility.
Commonwealth v. Crider, 361 A.2d 352 (Pa. Super. 1976).
In 1971, Richard David Crider was convicted of forcible rape, in
a non-jury trial and sentenced to three and one-half to seven years
in prison. More than one year after his post-verdict motions were
denied, Crider appealed the conviction under the Post Conviction
Hearing Act2 and the Dauphin County Court of Common Pleas filed
an order allowing his appeal nunc pro tunc from the judgment of
sentence.3
The appellant based his appeal to the Superior Court of Pennsyl-
vania on the trial court's refusal to permit the prosecutrix to answer
the question whether she had ever had sexual relations prior to the
alleged rape. He argued that in Pennsylvania a prosecutrix in a rape
case may be asked if she had engaged in sexual intercourse on prior
occasions,4 and asserted that the question should have been permit-
ted on either of two grounds: to determine whether the prosecutrix
understood the meaning of the word "intercourse," or to impeach
her credibility.'
The superior court quickly dismissed the appellant's first con-
tention, describing as "preposterous" the argument that a female
1. Recent legislation revising the rape law was pending at the time of the Crider decision
and was enacted approximately two months afterwards. Act of May 18, 1976, No. 53, §§ 1-2,
[1976] Laws of Pa. __, amending PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 3104, 3106 (1973). For
the text of the relevant amendments see note 16 infra.
Appellant and two companions had approached the prosecutrix on a rural road. One of the
companions and the appellant forced her to the ground and had sexual intercourse with her.
Crider's companion was also charged with rape, but pleaded guilty to assault with intent to
ravish and testified for the Commonwealth. Commonwealth v. Crider, 361 A.2d 352, 353 (Pa.
Super. 1976).
2. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, §§ 1180-1 to -14 (Supp. 1976).
3. 361 A.2d at 353.
4. Id. at 354. See notes 11 and 12 and acompanying text infra.
5. 361 A.2d at 353-54. The appellant also argued that the verdict was against the weight
of the evidence. Relying on Johnson Appeal, 445 Pa. 270, 284 A.2d 780 (1971), and Common-
wealth v. Richardson, 232 Pa. Super. 123, 334 A.2d 700 (1975), the court affirmed the "long
standing" rule that the testimony of the victim, without more, is sufficient to prove the
element of penetration. The court found that every other point of the prosecutrix's testimony
was corroborated and the verdict was therefore amply supported by the evidence. 361 A.2d
at 356.
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may not understand sexual intercourse without first experiencing
it.' The unanimous court then held that prior sexual experiences are
not relevant to a witness' character for truth and veracity and there-
fore may not be introduced to impeach a prosecutrix's credibility.7
The court, speaking through Judge Spaeth, first discussed the use
of evidence of prior sexual experience to impeach the credibility of
a witness. It relied primarily on Gilchrist v. McKee' for the general
proposition that if the witness' veracity is at issue, the only legiti-
mate consideration is his character for truthfulness.9 The law of
Pennsylvania, noted Judge Spaeth, has long been that a person's
previous sexual experience may not be introduced to impeach him
as a witness.'0 Focusing on the particular crime of rape, the court
next addressed the appellant's contention that Commonwealth v.
Eberhardt" provided authority for permitting him to ask the prose-
cutrix whether she had engaged in sexual intercourse on previous
occasions. In Eberhardt, the Pennsylvania Superior Court upheld
an instruction which said the testimony of a rape victim that she
was not a virgin, coupled with evidence of her bad moral reputation,
was relevant to the jury's consideration of whether she consented to
the sexual intercourse.' 2 The Crider court limited Eberhardt to cases
in which consent was an issue, and since no issue of consent was
involved in Crider,'3 the appellant's reliance on Eberhardt was un-
founded. 4 Judge Spaeth also noted that even in cases involving the
issue of consent, only proof of reputation, rather than proof of spe-
cific instances of intercourse, is permitted. Insofar as the Eberhardt
instruction would permit asking the prosecutrix if she was a virgin
6. The court suggested that if counsel thought the prosecutrix did not understand the
meaning of sexual intercourse, he should have asked her to define the term. Id. at 353.
7. Id. at 354.
8. 4 Watts 380 (Pa. 1835) (action to recover proceeds of sheriff's sale).
9. The court also relied on two murder cases as upholding the Gilchrist principle. See
Commonwealth v. Williams, 209 Pa. 529, 58 A. 922 (1904); Commonwealth v. Bubnis, 197
Pa. 542, 47 A. 748 (1901).
10. 361 A.2d at 354.
11. 164 Pa. Super. 591, 67 A.2d 613 (1949) (evidence of bad reputation for chastity admis-
sible as bearing on the question of prosecutrix's consent).
12. The Eberhardt jury instruction described as "improper" in Crider read:
The girl admitted that she was not a virgin . . . . The Jury should be instructed that
this fact, together with evidence of bad repute for morality and chastity, could be a
basis for a finding by the Jury that the carnal knowledge by them was with her consent.
Id. at 603, 67 A.2d at 619, cited in 361 A.2d at 355.
13. Crider himself testified that the prosecutrix did not consent. 361 A.2d at 354.
14. Id.
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prior to the alleged rape, it was specifically overruled by the Crider
court."
Crider and the subsequent legislation it foreshadowed" must be
analyzed against the background of general principles of evidence
and their relationship to the particular crime of rape. It is well
established that for any evidence to be admissible it must be rele-
vant; 7 it must tend to establish the proposition for which it is of-
fered to prove. 8 When the issue is the credibility of a witness, evi-
dence sought to be introduced for impeachment purposes must tend
to show the witness is not to be believed. In Pennsylvania the only
character evidence relevant to credibility is evidence of a witness'
specific reputation for truth and veracity. 9 Even introducing evi-
dence of general reputation, as opposed to specific reputation for
truth and veracity, in order to impeach credibility is generally rec-
15. Id. at 355.
16. The Pennsylvania General Assembly amended the rape law to specify that a rape
victim's testimony shall be viewed in the same way as the testimony of the victim of any other
crime:
The credibility of an alleged victim of an offense under this chapter shall be deter-
mined by the same standard as is the credibility of an alleged victim of any other crime
... . [N]o instructions shall be given cautioning the jury to view the alleged victim's
testimony in any other way than that in which all victims' testimony is viewed.
Act of May 18, 1976, No. 53, § 2, [1976] Laws of Pa_ ___ amending PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 3106 (1973). The amendments also prohibit the introduction of evidence of the
victim's past sexual conduct:
Evidence of specific instances of the alleged victim's past sexual conduct, opinion
evidence of the alleged victim's past sexual conduct, and reputation evidence of the
alleged victim's past sexual conduct shall not be admissible in prosecutions under this
chapter except evidence of the alleged victim's past sexual conduct with the defendant
where consent of the alleged victim is at issue and such evidence is otherwise admissi-
ble pursuant to the rules of evidence.
Act of May 18, 1976, No. 53, § 1, [1976] Laws of Pa. -, amending PA. CONSOL. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 3104 (1973).
Discussing the legislation then pending before the General Assembly, Judge Spaeth noted
that even where consent is an issue, the bill would prohibit the use of prior sexual experiences
with men other than the defendant. 361 A.2d at 355. Accord, State ex rel. Pope v. Superior
Court, 113 Ariz. 22, 545 P.2d 946 (1976) (evidence of prior consensual experiences with defen-
dant sufficiently probative to outweigh its inflammatory effects).
17. E.g., Bowers v. Garfield, 382 F. Supp. 503, 510 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (malpractice suit
construing Pennsylvania law); Rich Hill Coal Co. v. Bashore, 334 Pa. 449, 483, 7 A.2d 302,
319 (1939) (relevance of evidence discussed in constitutional challenge to Workmen's Com-
pensation Act); MCCORMICK'S HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 184 (2d ed. E. Cleary
1972) [hereinafter cited as MCCORMICK]; J. THAYER, PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE 264-
65 (1898).
18. See MCCORMICK, supra note 17, § 185.
19. Gilchrist v. McKee, 4 Watts 380 (Pa. 1835).
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ognized as intended only to excite prejudice against a witness for
reasons that have little if anything to do with credibility.'"
Although these fundamental rules of evidence have "long been
the law of Pennsylvania,"'" in cases involving the crime of rape, the
issue of the prosecutrix's credibility has often been accorded differ-
ent treatment than the credibility of other witnesses.2 Inquiry into
past acts or reputation for unchastity has generally been considered
irrelevant to a witness' character for truth and veracity and there-
fore beyond the reach of trial court examination. As demonstrated
in Eberhardt, however, the jury in a rape case has been permitted
to consider evidence that the prosecutrix had sexual intercourse on
prior occasions as proof bearing on credibility, even though such
evidence has been rejected in cases not involving rape.? In relying
on Gilchrist, a civil case which did not involve rape, 4 and by explic-
itly limiting Eberhardt to cases where consent is an issue, the Crider
court sought to eliminate this distinction in testing a witness' credi-
bility. This judicial mandate has now become statutory law in
Pennsylvania.?
Other jurisdictions have split over whether credibility can be im-
peached by evidence of prior sexual conduct. In Redmon v. State,"
20. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Payne, 205 Pa. 101, 54 A. 489 (1903) (general reputation
evidence inadmissible to impeach credibility of witness in murder trial). In Payne, the lower
court remarked that although evidence of a witness' general reputation might include his
reputation for the specific trait of veracity, insofar as his general reputation included reputa-
tion for other traits, it must be excluded as irrelevant. Id. at 102, 54 A. at 490.
21. See 361 A.2d at 354 & n.2.
22. A sponsor of the recent amendments to the rape law commented:
As it presently stands, [rape] is the only offense where the victim has to establish her
own good conduct. No other offense in this state requires that the victim, the person
who has been assaulted, robbed and so forth, has to establish his own good conduct to
be a victim. Rape does.
1 PA. LEGIS. J., 159th Sess. 3249 (1975) (House) (remarks of Representative Berson). This
recognition by Representative Berson was reflected in the eventual legislation which, among
other things, is designed to rectify this imbalance. See note 16 supra. Seegenerally S. BROWN-
MILLER, AGAINST OUR WILL: MEN, WOMEN AND RAPE (1975).
23. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Gates, 392 Pa. 557, 141 A.2d 219 (1958) (evidence of
extramarital relationship not admissible to impeach witness in murder trial); Gerhart v.
Gerhart, 162 Pa. Super. 252, 57 A.2d 595 (1948) (evidence of adultery inadmissible to impeach
witness in divorce hearing).
24. Gilchrist v. McKee, 4 Watts 380 (Pa. 1835).
25. See note 16 supra.
26. 150 Neb. 62, 33 N.W.2d 349 (1948). Although Redmon was a sodomy case, the court
noted that its holding would apply to rape cases and used rape cases as authority for its view.
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the Nebraska Supreme Court concluded that evidence of the
witness' previous sexual experiences was admissible on the issue of
credibility; moreover, if such evidence were excluded, the defendant
could not obtain a fair trial. The Redmon court reasoned that a rape
victim's chastity or lack of it has some bearing on her credibility.
However, in a well-reasoned opinion, the Supreme Court of Virginia
reached the opposite conclusion. Wynne v. Commonwealth" in-
volved a rape victim who had previously had sexual intercourse with
the defendant. The defendant proposed to call four witnesses to
testify that each had engaged in sexual intercourse with the prose-
cutrix on prior occasions. The court upheld the trial court's refusal
to admit the testimony, holding that specific acts of bad conduct
may not be used to impeach a witness' credibility. 8 The court rea-
soned that the admission of evidence of such acts, and the rebuttal
evidence that would follow, would inject collateral issues into the
case and divert the jury's attention from the guilt or innocence of
the accused. 2
Although Wynne and Crider reached their conclusion by different
reasoning, both decisions recognize that logically, the character or
reputation of an alleged crime victim is relevant only insofar as it
enables the fact finder to determine if she is telling the truth.
Evidence of a witness' past reputation for veracity tends to prove
present untruthfulness indirectly, 0 and when evidence of prior sex-
ual experiences or immoral reputation is admitted, the inference of
untruthfulness is even more remote from the evidence. The fact
finder is first asked to infer from the witness' previous sexual con-
duct that her character for veracity is poor, then to infer from this
that she is unlikely to be telling the truth on this occasion. 3'
See also MCCORMICK, supra note 17, § 44; 3A J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 924a (Chadbourn rev.
ed. 1970). Although Professor Wigmore is often cited as authority for allowing impeachment
by evidence of prior sexual experience, what he advocates is psychological examination of the
victim to distinguish those persons emotionally disturbed to the point they fabricate rape
charges. Id. For a well-reasoned opinion holding that the trial judge has the discretion to order
such an examination, see Ballard v. Superior Court, 64 Cal. 2d 159, 410 P.2d 838, 49 Cal.
Rptr. 302 (1966).
27. 218 S.E.2d 445 (Va. 1975).
28. Id. at 446; accord, State v. Wolf, 40 Wash. 2d 648, 245 P.2d 1009 (1952).
29. 218 S.E.2d at 446.
30. Indeed, McCormick suggests: "[I1n this elusive realm of reputation as to character
it is best to reach for the highest degree of relevancy that is attainable." McCoRMICK, supra
note 17, § 44 at 91.
31. See, e.g., State v. Wolf, 40 Wash. 2d 648, 653, 245 P.2d 1009, 1012 (1952) (holding that
1976
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It might be argued, as in Redmon, that prejudice against the
defendant will result if evidence of the prosecutrix's prior sexual
conduct is excluded. However, the traditional methods of impeach-
ing a witness-contradictory evidence, inconsistent statements,
proof of bias, reputation for veracity, and conviction of certain
crimes-are available to the rape defendant and would be sufficient
to ensure that he receives a fair trial, just as they are sufficient
protection for other criminal defendants.2 Limiting impeachment
to these methods accommodates the interests of both the defendant
and the prosecutrix; prejudice to the defendant is minimized and
the victim's integrity is not impugned by inquiry into past intimate
conduct which has no bearing on her ability to give a truthful ac-
count of the activity giving rise to the charge of rape.
Although the impact of Crider has been largely superseded by
subsequent legislation,3 3 the superior court's opinion represents a
logical, objective and enlightened view of the rape victim's situa-
tion. Previously, many rape victims had been reluctant to proceed
with a rape complaint because of the possibility their private sexual
conduct would be scrutinized in the courtroom.3 4 The superior
court's decision in Crider and the legislation passed by the Pennsyl-
vania General Assembly go far to obviate this situation, and should
encourage victims to report rapes and prosecute rapists without
having to fear that their own reputation and sense of self-esteem will
be damaged in the process.
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the jury should not be permitted to deduce the victim's character for veracity from her
reputation for lack of chastity).
32. See Note, If She Consented Once, She Consented Again-A Legal Fallacy in Forcible
Rape Cases, 10 VAL. U.L. REV. 127, 147 (1976).
33. See note 16 supra.
34. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE OBSERVANCE OF INTERNATIONAL WOMEN'S YEAR,
To FORM A MORE PERFECT UNION . . ." JUSTICE FOR AMERICAN WOMEN 264 (1976).
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